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Abstract of Thesis 
Henry B. Bongers 
Safety Studies 
The Increased Cost of Security to the Food Industry Since September 11, 2001 
May 2004 
Dr. Thomas Anderson, Thesis Chair 
The University of Wisconsin-Whitewater 
 
The objective of this study is to describe the increased security cost to the food 
industry after the terrorist events of September 11, 2001. This includes government 
required initiatives and industry expectations. 
 A detailed analysis was made of the increased security costs at all 42 facilities in 
one large company. The total cost to the company was divided by forty-two to arrive at 
an average cost to each facility. This cost was extrapolated to the estimated four hundred 
thousand food processing facilities worldwide to arrive at an estimated total cost to the 
industry. 
 The increased cost to the company for compliance with programs and policies 
was $496,010, or an average of $11,810 per facility for the first year. Extrapolating to the 
whole industry this is an increase in security cost of U.S. domestic facilities of $2.4 
billion and to the entire worldwide industry of $4.7 billion. The costs to the company for 
physical security will be $222,200 for the first year for an average cost of $5,290 to each 
facility. Future costs to the company will be $1.0 million annually or $24,606 per facility. 
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This includes physical security, program compliance, and training. Future costs to the 
U.S. domestic industry will be $4.9 billion and $9.8 billion annually to the worldwide 
industry to maintain the security levels. 
 The terrorist events of September 11, 2001 increased the awareness of the 
vulnerabilities of the food industry. This increased awareness resulted in requirements to 
improve security. The requirements came from both the government and private industry 
expectations. These requirements result in increased costs to the food industry. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to show the cost of increased security to the food 
industry, a cost brought on by both governmental and industry pressures. Those 
influences have placed an additional financial burden on the food industry. 
On May 18, 2002, the World Health Assembly adopted a resolution that expressed 
concern about threats against civilian populations. These threats were the use of 
biological, chemical, and radio nuclear materials. The concern is directed toward any 
individual or group that seeks to gain personnel, political, or financial gain through the 
deliberate contamination of food. The objective, as identified by the World Health 
Organization (WHO), is to cause widespread incapacitation and injury and to effect terror 
and panic. WHO identifies civilian populations as more vulnerable than military 
personnel since the civilians are of all ages and health status.  
There are many instances where food has been deliberately sabotaged for gain. In 
1984 members of a religious cult contaminated salad bars with Salmonella typhimurium, 
causing 751 cases of salmonellosis (2). In 1996 a disgruntled laboratory employee 
deliberately infected food to be consumed by colleagues with Shigella dysenteria type 2, 
causing illness in 12 people (1). The World Health Organization states that while few 
incidents or threats of deliberate contamination of food with chemical, biological, or 
radio nuclear agents on a massive scale have been documented, it is prudent to consider 
basic counter measures. 
Chemicals that can contaminate food include pesticides, mycotoxins, heavy metals, 
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and other acutely toxic chemicals such as cyanide.  A chemical agent in cooking oil sold 
in Spain in 1981 injured 20,000 and killed over 800 (1).  Watermelon grown in soil 
treated with aldicarb resulted in illness in 1,373 people (1). An unintentional outbreak of 
hepatitis A in China, associated with eating raw clams, sickened 300,000 people (1). 
Deliberate contamination of food might be easier to control than an airborne chemical or 
biological attack. Air movement, particle size, stability of the agent, and dose are all 
variables that make an airborne attack an uncertainty. 
Deliberate attacks can cause economic disruption. Citrus fruit exported from Israel to 
several European countries was contaminated with mercury and led to a significant trade 
disruption (1). Alleged contamination of Chilean grapes with cyanide in 1989 led to a 
recall of all Chilean fruit in Canada and the USA (1). The publicity resulted in a boycott 
by American consumers. Damage from this allegation led to the losses of several hundred 
million dollars. More than 100 growers and shippers went bankrupt (1). The disruption 
caused by hoof and mouth disease in the United Kingdom and Mad Cow disease also 
shows how food supplies can be affected internationally. 
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September 2001 the United States General Accounting Office presented its report to 
Congressional Committees on Bioterrorism – Federal Research and Preparedness 
Activities. The research for this report was gathered from January through September 
2001. This report was constructed prior to the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) and 
shows the history and proposed budgets of agencies in combating terrorism. It is 
important to see what the budgets and associated costs were prior to the events of 9/11.  
September 11, 2001 terrorists struck the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and had one 
plane thwarted. One result was a change in focus of security within the food industry.  
Companies in the food industry were asked by their customers to re-examine the security 
of products. The vulnerability of the food industry was known and had been studied by 
the World health Organization. The United States government developed two initiatives, 
the Food and Drug Bioterrorist Act and the Customs – Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism (C-TPAT). The effects those events had on the government and policies 
implemented after 9/11 is far reaching.  
In the past, Congress passed several laws aimed at preventing the acquisition and use 
of chemical or biological weapons from 1989-1996. The National Defense Authorization 
Act for fiscal year 1997 (P.L. 104-201) authorized $97 million for domestic emergency 
assistance programs (3). This includes the implementation of programs providing 
training, advice, and the loan of equipment to state and local emergency response 
agencies and assistance in establishing medical strike teams.  
The USDA Animal and Plant Inspection Service had no funding for developing 
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educational materials and training programs specifically dealing with Bioterrorism. This 
was funded at $0.2 million for fiscal year 2001 (3). The Health and Human Services – 
Food & Drug Administration had funding for $0.1 million for improving capabilities to 
identify and characterize food borne pathogens and identifying biological agents using 
animal studies and microbiological surveillance (3). This was increased to $2.1 million in 
fiscal 2001 (3). In addition to food protection, the FDA is responsible for medical 
countermeasures. A portion of the revenue was spent in “tabletop” exercises simulating 
the release of a biological agent (3). 
The FDA budget is not limited to food protection issues. Although participating in 
this exercise some FDA and USDA officials have said that they felt overlooked in 
Bioterrorism related planning and policy (3). Presidential Directive 62 was developed 
without overtly including the USDA, even though the USDA would have key 
responsibilities if terrorists targeted the food supply (3).  
The Federal Response Plan is authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 
and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, as amended).  The Stafford Act describes 
how the Federal government is required to respond to domestic situations in which the 
President has declared an emergency requiring federal disaster assistance. The 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is the primary agency for function 
#8 of the Stafford Act – Providing assistance for public health and medical care needs. 
The USDA is one of the agencies providing support under this function. The USDA has 
become involved in Bioterrorism because of the potential of the food supply being used 
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as a vehicle for a biological attack against the civilian population. The USDA received 
little funding for activities on Bioterrorism (Table 1). 
TABLE 1 - USDA Funding Fiscal Year 
Program/Initiative 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Agricultural Research Service  
Research Activities –  
Detection of Biological Agents 
$0 $0 $0 $0.5
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
Preparedness Activities – Education and Training $0 $0 $0 $0.2
Total $0 $0 $0 $0.7
 
The Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) routinely responds to actual and potential 
food-borne disease outbreaks. The response to this kind of attack would mirror the 
response for any food-borne disease outbreak. The FSIS has not received any funding to 
address Bioterrorism attacks. There was no budget for any of these activities until fiscal 
year 2001, before the events of September 11. 
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002 
June 12, 2002 President Bush signed into law the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002. The FDA announced the regulation would 
require domestic and foreign food facilities that manufacture, process, pack, or hold food 
for human or animal consumption in the United States to register with the agency by 
December 12, 2003. This is expected to enhance the FDA’s ability to regulate more than 
400,000 domestic and foreign facilities that ship food to or through the United States. 
This study is of the effect of terrorism on the industry. The FDA estimates there are 
400,000 facilities that will be required to register under the act. The cost of security to the 
industry is based on the number of facilities required to register. These facilities are 
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domestic or foreign that: manufacture, process, pack, distribute, receive, or hold food for 
consumption by humans or animals. This study does not include farms, restaurants, retail 
food establishments, non-profit establishments that prepare and serve food, and fishing 
vessels that do not engage in processing. Also not included are establishments that are 
exclusively monitored by the USDA. These facilities may incur the same costs but are 
not included in the estimated number of facilities required to register. 
There are five titles to the FDA Bioterrorism Act,  
Title I – National Preparedness for Bioterrorism and Other Public Health 
Emergencies; 
Title II – Enhancing Controls on Dangerous Biological Agents and Toxins; 
Title III – Protecting Safety and Security of Food and Drug Supply; 
Title IV – Drinking Water Security and Safety; 
Title V – Additional Provisions; 
The main provisions of the Act that affect Food Processors, Manufacturers, 
Transporters, and Storage Facilities are contained in Title III. These are: 
• Section 305 – Registration of Food Facilities 
The Bioterrorism Act requires the owner, operator, or agent in charge of a domestic 
facility to submit a registration to the FDA. This facility must manufacture, process, 
pack, or hold food for human or animal consumption.  Domestic facilities must register 
even if the food does not reach interstate commerce. Foreign facilities that perform the 
same activities must also register unless the food undergoes further processing or 
packaging.  Foreign facilities must include the name of the U.S. agent. Registration does 
not include farms, retail food establishments, or restaurants where food is prepared for or 
served directly to the consumer. Under the Bioterrorism Act it is a prohibited act for a 
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facility to not be registered by December 12, 2003. The FDA can bring criminal action in 
federal court to prosecute persons who commit a prohibited act. Penalties are given in the 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act under Section 301. There are multiple penalties listed 
under this section. These range from up to a year in prison and/or up to $1,000 fine; to up 
to 10 years in prison and/or up to $250,000 fine. Unregistered foreign facilities will have 
the shipment held at the U.S. border and refused entry. 
Registration can be done on the Internet or through the mail system. There is no fee to 
register. The FDA estimates 202,000 U.S. facilities and 205,000 foreign facilities will be 
required to register. Information taken from the FDA Website states registration is 
estimated to take two to twelve hours per response for Form 3537 and one hour per 
response for form 3537a (10). 
• Section 306 – Establishment and Maintenance of Records 
Section 306 requires the FDA to establish requirements for the creating and 
maintenance of records needed to determine the immediate previous sources and the 
immediate recipients of food. These records are to allow the FDA to address serious 
health threats to humans or animals. Those facilities required to maintain records are the 
same as those required to register. Existing records can be used to fulfill the requirements 
of this Title, however all information required by the Title must be available when 
requested by the FDA. 
• Section 307 – Prior Notification 
Section 307 requires that prior notice of food shipments into or through the United 
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States be given to the FDA no less than 4 hours nor more than 5 days before arrival at the 
border. The notice must include a description of the article, the manufacturer, shipper, 
country of origin, and the anticipated port of entry. Prior notices must be submitted 
electronically through the FDA’s web based Prior Notice System. The FDA estimates 
that it will take one hour of time to complete each entry. Each entry consists of 2.6 
articles of food. Each article would take an average of 23 minutes to complete. This is 
taken from OMB Approval #0910-520 on the FDA Website (11). 
• Section 303 – Administrative Detention 
Section 303 authorizes the Secretary, through the FDA, to order the detention of food 
if an Officer, or qualified employee finds credible evidence or information indicating an 
article presents a threat of adverse health or death to humans or animals. 
FDA Security Guidelines 
The FDA also published Security Guidelines for Food Establishment Operations. 
These have five main points to address: 
i) Management 
ii) Human Element – staff 
iii) Human Element - public 
iv) Facility 
v) Operations 
 
• Management 
“Recommendations of the FDA commence with the facility management preparing 
for the possibility of tampering or malicious, criminal, or terrorist actions” (8). The first 
recommendation is assigning the responsibility for security. This is to be given to 
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“knowledgeable” individual(s). It is expected that an initial assessment of food security 
procedures be completed with a management strategy including preparation and 
response. The FDA recommends planning an emergency evacuation including security 
breeches. The floor plan of the facility should be kept off-site in a secure location. 
Management should be familiar with the local community emergency response system. 
Security should be built into job performance so that all staff becomes alert to security 
issues. A communication system should be established to spread concerns about security 
issues. Finally, the FDA recommends a strategy for communicating with the public about 
food security issues. 
Supervisors are also addressed in FDA Security. An adequate level of supervision 
should be provided to all staff. This includes services such as cleaning and contractors. 
Routine security checks of the premises should be done to look for signs of tampering or 
other malicious activity. There should be a recall strategy that identifies responsible 
persons and their back up. The recall should provide for proper handling and disposition 
of recalled product. Customer contacts should also be a part of the recall program. 
Management needs to have a strategy for investigating threats or information about 
malicious activity. 
• Human Element – Staff 
The FDA recommends examining the background of all staff as appropriate to their 
position. Access to sensitive areas and how closely they are to be supervised are also 
issues when considering a background check. Screening should be applied equally to all 
  
 
10 
 
 
 
 
staff. Supervisors should know who should be on premises and where their workstations 
are for each shift. This information should be kept updated.  A system of positive 
identification of the workforce should be established, this includes badges, uniforms, etc. 
These should be collected when the employee is no longer associated with the company. 
Levels of access should be determined for security within the facility. Staff should be 
assessed as to their level of access within the facility.  Staff should also be restricted in 
their access to particular parts of the facility and only during their work hours. Systems to 
limit access must be continually updated when changes to staff occur. These include 
keypad codes, electronic swipe cards, key locks, etc. Personnel items should not be 
allowed on the establishment. Personnel lockers should be on a regular inspection 
schedule. Food security awareness should be part of the staff-training schedule. This 
includes information on prevention, detection, and response to suspicious activity 
• Human Element – Public 
The FDA recommends inspecting incoming/outgoing vehicles, packages, and 
briefcases for suspicious activity (8). These are listed as “to the extent practical”. Access 
to the establishment should be restricted. All visitors should have a valid reason for being 
on the premises. The identity should be verified. Access to locker rooms and food 
handling areas should be restricted. 
• Facility 
The physical security of the facility should be protected with fencing or other 
deterrent, when appropriate. Doors should be secured when not in use or being 
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monitored. Restricted areas should have the number of entrances minimized. Bulk 
unloading equipment and areas should be secured.  A responsible person should account 
for all keys. Security of the premises should be monitored. A system of controlling 
vehicle parking should be established. Parking should be separate from food processing, 
storage, and utility areas. 
Access to the laboratory should be restricted. Lab materials should remain in the lab. 
Approved employees should only access sensitive materials. A system of positive 
controls on chemical reagents should be developed. There should be investigations into 
missing chemicals. Proper disposal procedures for chemicals should be developed and 
followed. This should be in a manner that minimizes the potential for use as a 
contaminate.  
Pesticides and cleaning chemical should be locked with access limited. The amount 
should also be minimized. Storage should be away from food handling areas. Chemicals 
must be properly labeled and used according to label instructions. Knowing what 
chemicals are required to be present in the facility is also important. Variations outside 
the normal inventory should be investigated. 
• Operations 
Incoming materials should only be acquired from properly licensed, permitted, and 
registered suppliers. Steps should be taken to ensure the supplier practices appropriate 
security. Requesting locked and/or sealed containers. The transporter should be able to 
verify the location of the load. Delivery schedules should be established and unexplained 
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or unexpected deliveries should be investigated. Shipping documents should be inspected 
for suspicious alterations. Incoming materials should be inspected. Suspect food should 
be rejected. 
The facility should set up a system for handling distressed, damaged, returned and 
rework products. A work in progress area should be established for materials in use. 
Missing or extra stock should be investigated. The FDA recommends securing product 
labels and packaging materials. Reuse of containers should be minimized. 
Access controls should be established to airflow, water, electricity, and refrigeration 
systems. Water systems and trucks should be equipped with back flow devices. Testing 
water systems for potability should be done on a regular basis with investigations of non-
regular results. Alternate sources of water should be identified for use during emergency 
situations where normal water systems have been compromised. 
Public storage facilities should provide appropriate security measures. These facilities 
should be randomly inspected. Requesting all shipments have locks/seals with the seal 
number provided to the consignee. An inventory of finished products should be 
maintained and deviations outside the norm should be investigated.  
Procedures for ensuring the security of incoming mail should be established. These 
include locating the mailroom away from food processing areas, securing the mailroom, 
and following the United States Postal Service guidance. 
Appropriate clearance should be given only to those cleared for access to computer 
systems. A system for revoking access when it is no longer required or the employee is 
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no longer with the company. A system for tracking computer transactions should be 
established. Appropriate virus protection should be maintained and the system should be 
backed up on a regular basis. The computer security system should be validated. 
Customs – Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 
The events of 9/11 caused the closure of all borders into the United States. This 
stopped all commerce in and out of the country. The Customs Service is identifying a 
system to allow items into the country at a faster rate. This is in response to the potential 
of another attack. The system is known as the Customs – Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism (C-TPAT).  C-TPAT is designed to address security procedures of all 
components of a global supply chain. These components are production, transportation, 
and distribution (9). The priority of Customs is protecting the U.S. Border.  C-TPAT is a 
voluntary program in which all participating companies that import into the United States 
cooperate with Customs in establishing security programs. Customs will certify members 
of the program. 
Customs has asked companies to join the partnership by agreeing to identify security 
steps taken within the company. Customs will do an analysis of the steps and determine if 
the steps are sufficient. An application for partnership is sent to Customs for review. An 
initial determination is made of those steps before the company is accepted into 
membership. Customs also does an on-site review of the company and their supplier(s). 
As of January 8, 2004 there were 5,200 companies in the Custom’s application database 
(5). These were not broken down into industry categories. The C-TPAT application 
  
 
14 
 
 
 
 
process is a two-step process. The first step is to sign and submit an agreement to 
participate. The second step is to complete and submit the questionnaire. There are two 
major benefits of this program to Customs 1) border security is enhanced; and 2) 
resources can be targeted to higher risk importers since the low risk importers are 
identified. 
Members that are importing can expect a reduced number of inspections, a 
specific account manager for their firm, access to the C-TPAT membership list, and 
greater emphasis on self-policing. Reduced inspections could save $500 or more per 
container and the shipments of a member go to the top of the list for entry (9). The 
Security Profile Supplement reviews eleven segments of facility security.  These are: 
1. Facility Security/Theft Prevention – Information is requested with regards to 
facility security. This includes building access controls, use of security personnel, 
electronic surveillance, building materials, and perimeter fencing and lighting. 
2. Personnel Security – Requests information about employees in regard to 
personnel security. This includes pre-employment and periodic background 
review procedures, issuance and use of employee identification, education in 
security, documentation fraud, computer security and procedures for reporting 
and managing problems related to employees. 
3. Identification system – requests an outline of procedures governing the use and 
issuance of employee identification. 
4. Education/Training Awareness – requests an outline of security awareness 
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training programs for employees. 
5. Personnel Screening – requests pre-employment screening procedures. 
6. Visitor Controls – requests procedures for visitor security. 
7. Transportation – requests procedures used in tracking cargo, containers, and 
trailers to their final destination. 
8. Product, Production, Assembly, and Packing – reviews security measures in place 
for product production areas to include access control, fencing, the use of security 
personnel, and inventory of packaging materials. 
9. Receiving, Shipping – Reviews security for receiving and shipping process. This 
includes access control, container security measures, high security seals, 
procedures for reporting inventory discrepancies, vehicle/container inspection 
procedures, and the use of security personnel. 
10. Service Provider Requirements – requests information on written standards for 
service provider’s security. Do the providers participate in C-TPAT? 
11. Self-Policing – As a member of C-TPAT a customized, internal self-policing 
program should be developed and implemented in order to review your security 
procedures on a regular basis. An outline is requested in regards to the 
implementation or existence of such a program 
FDA Funding Prior to September 11, 2001 
The FDA has responsibilities for activities on Bioterrorism. These are spread 
throughout the agency. The FDA is responsible for “the seizure, removal, and/or 
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destruction of any contaminated and unsafe products” (3). The FDA revised its’ 
Emergency Operations Response Plan to include Bioterrorism preparedness and 
response. Congress had allocated $5 million to the FDA for Bioterrorism activities. The  
TABLE 2 – FDA Bioterrorism Funding Fiscal Year 
Program/Initiative 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research  
Pre-market evaluation of vaccines, develop vaccines * $1.2 $7.5 $7.0
Centers for Devices and Radiological Health 
Develop data requirements for approving devices 
intended to detect exposure to or infection with 
biological agents 
* $0.1 $0.8 $0.9
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
Determine procedures for allowing use of not-yet-
approved drugs, specify data needed for approval and 
labeling, gather and supply information  
* $0.2 $0.4 $0.7
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition 
Monitor food supply, communicate with state and local 
officials 
* $0 $0 $0.3
Center for Veterinary Medicine 
Communicate with state officials, held meeting on 
Bioterrorism 
* $0.1 $0.1 $0.3
National Center for Toxicological Research 
Define biological mechanisms of action underlying 
toxicity of products, identify indications of toxicity 
associated with biological agents 
* $0.2 $0.1 $0.5
Office of Regulatory Affairs 
Communicate with other agencies and the public, 
conduct investigations 
* $0 $0 $1.5
Total * $1.9 $9.0 $11.7
* Agency noted funds were expended but did not report levels (dollars are in millions) 
HHS had also funded $7.5 million for vaccine projects. Reported funding for FDA 
Bioterrorism Activities is given on Table 2 (3). 
In the comments for the United States General Accounting Office Bioterrorism – 
Federal Research and Preparedness Activities, September, 2001 it was noted that “Quite 
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possibly a Bioterrorism attack may initially be observed as a naturally-occurring 
epidemic of unknown origin.” This is important in that the state and local health facilities 
would be the first to respond. The tables show that prior to 9/11/01 there was limited 
funding to respond to a Bioterrorist attack.  
 
Department of Homeland Security 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a direct response to the events of 
9/11. The purpose of this organization was to bring all elements of prevention, response, 
and recovery under one umbrella. This would facilitate communication between the 
responsible organizations. Food protection organizations such as the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) were 
moved from the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to the DHS. This 
created the largest department in the government. It was also the most extensive 
reorganization of government in the last fifty years (4). 
The strategic objectives of the DHS are (4): 
i) Prevent Terrorist attacks within the United States 
ii) Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and 
iii) Minimize damage and recover from attacks that do occur. 
Six major areas are identified within the mission of the DHS. Among these are 
Border and Transportation Security. Virtually all communities in the world are connected 
to the transportation network. The DHS is charged with promoting an efficient and 
reliable flow of goods and services across the borders while at the same time preventing 
terrorists from using this network to deliver weapons of terrorism. The transportation of 
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food is of serious concern to the Customs and Border Patrol. 
There have been nine Homeland Security Directives (HSPD) published since the 
events of September 11, 2001. The purpose of the directives is to record and 
communicate presidential decisions about homeland security policies of the United 
States. The first was published October 29, 2001. The first was the organization of the 
Homeland Security Council. The most recent, HSPD-9, issued January 30, 2004 
addresses the agricultural and food systems and establishes priorities.  
The United States spends roughly $100 Billion per year on homeland security 
starting with the 2003 fiscal year budget proposed in February 2002 (4). This includes the 
Custom Service’s and FDA’s proposed legislation and increased federal spending to 
ensure the implementation of their initiatives. 
The agri-food system includes all aspects of industry from the farm to retail sales. 
The system is vulnerable to terrorism due to three main factors (6). 
1. “Geographical dispersion increases the cost of maintaining security across the 
system 
2. Products intermingle from many sources and at many levels, increasing the 
possibility that contamination could spread from a single source 
3. Because of levels of trade (both imports and exports) there is a need for 
international security of both U.S. exports and U.S. imports.” 
Agriculture is identified as a critical infrastructure for the U.S. and any attack on 
the industry would have a severe effect on the economy. While no terrorist acts have been 
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identified against the food supply, accidental events have had serious consequences. 
These include the outbreak of BSE in the United Kingdom cattle industry with a cost of 
$5.8 billion, accidental contamination of livestock feed with dioxin in Belgium – $850 
million, and simulated outbreak of BSE in California Dairy Industry - $4 – 13 Billion (6). 
An economic loss of this magnitude could also be incurred as a result of a rumor. The 
U.S. beef industry suffered when one calf believed to be infected with mad cow disease 
was found in a herd. Countries started to ban the import of U.S. beef. 
Suggested solutions to prevent the accidental or intentional introduction of foreign 
organism into the U.S. are inspection of imported soil and plant material. Establish 
National Crop nurseries to develop resistant genes, and prioritize potential threats to 
economic plants such as wheat (7). Examples of these are Dutch elm disease, Chestnut 
Blight, Citrus Canker, and plum poxvirus. There are many voids in the security of the 
U.S. plant protection systems. 
A provision of the Bioterrorist Act gives the USDA responsibilities for Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection (APHIS) activities.  The USDA has increased protection 
responsibilities against terrorist use of plant and animal disease organisms. The USDA 
has been directed to implement a central automated record-keeping system to track the 
status of animal and plant shipments and to develop strategies for dealing with intentional 
outbreaks of plant/animal disease from acts of terrorism. This is the only provision for the 
USDA under the Bioterrorist Act and the Department of Homeland Security 
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2) Materials and Methods 
A survey was sent to the membership of the National Safety Council’s Food and 
Beverage Section. There are 89 members of the National Safety Council’s Food and 
Beverage Section.  This survey asked if the membership had calculated the cost of 
additional security or the cost of complying with the FDA Bioterrorist Act. Two members 
responded that they were aware of the requirements and their facility was registered. The 
members did not know the cost of gaining compliance. Personal discussions at FDA 
Bioterrorist Act training and C-TPAT training with reporting companies that have 
participated yielded nothing on the costs of security due to these initiatives. Companies at 
the Customs training in San Francisco, October 2003 had not calculated the costs of 
complying with C-TPAT or the FDA Bioterrorism Act. 
One company (unnamed to protect confidentiality) was evaluated in detail.   The 
company registered 42 facilities with the FDA under the Bioterrorist Act. Costs for this 
company were calculated for training, registration activities, response to customer 
inquiries, and capital proposals for physical security needs. Total costs were divided by 
42 to determine an average facility cost. The average cost was multiplied by the number 
of facilities that the FDA projected to register. The total is extrapolated as the additional 
cost to the food industry as a whole. It should be noted that this company has facilities 
that are small, ranging in size from 9 to 200 employees. Costs that are fixed such as 
training responsible people do not change, but the training of a larger workforce would 
cost more. The costs to corporations with a larger employee base would provide 
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additional information not available for this study. 
Information on the threats of Bioterrorism was drawn from published articles and 
previous funding for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
Discussions and communication with other sources formed the remainder of this paper. 
Calculating the Cost 
The subject company, hereafter known as the Company, has 42 FDA registered 
facilities. Formulas for calculations are listed Appendix 1. The company’s first step in 
response to the events of September 11, 2001 was to convene a meeting of the executive 
board to determine the immediate threat to the company. All facilities were asked to 
submit a list of visitors to their facility for the previous three days and a copy of their 
visitor sign-in log.  Analysis of these logs showed there was a lack of discipline in 
knowing who was in the facility. The Visitor Logs did not match against the list of 
visitors. The Executive Board asked that security policies be developed to ensure all 
visitors were signed into and out of each facility. The Board requested a list of other 
security issues and recommended policies. The cost calculations start with the formation 
of committees. 
Policy and Program Compliance Cost  
Three committees were formed to develop policies on the following principles: 
• Physical security of the facility 
• Product/ingredient security 
• Employee Security 
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These committees were comprised of a mid-level Safety Manager and four first 
line supervisors. The cost of these meetings was $2,677 to develop their policies.  There 
were four policies issued to the forty-two facilities. These were: 
• SP 2.01 – Door Security 
• SP 2.02 – Visitor Access Policy 
• SP 2.03 – Security Log Maintenance 
• SP 2.04 – Workplace Violence. 
The total cost of developing four security policies was $10,708. Each policy was 
established to utilize the principles of security. The policy had to meet the test of 
deterring, delaying, or detecting, a threat. Threats from both internal and external sources 
were considered. 
A requirement of the Door security policy is to physically check the exterior 
doors once per shift to ensure all unmonitored doors are secure. A time of 30 minutes was 
the average time to complete a perimeter check of all doors at a facility. The cost of each 
check is $15.51. The Company has forty-two facilities. Sixteen facilities work twenty-
four hours a day, seven days a week. The sixteen facilities perform 3 checks each day that 
cost $16,978 each. Three plants work sixteen hours a day five days per week have a cost 
of $8,063 each, and twenty-three plants work five day per week with one shift have a cost 
of $4,031. The total cost to the company of performing these checks is $388,555. 
The mid-level safety manager was also requested to learn the interpretations of 
the FDA Bioterrorism Act. (Hereafter referred to as “the Act”) This was accomplished 
through an off site training session. The cost of attending the training sessions was 
$1,233. Costs included salary, benefits, transportation and expenses from Rockford, IL to 
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Minneapolis, MN for two days. 
Each facility in this study had to develop the information required by the Act in 
order to register. This took approximately one hour for each facility to assemble. One 
hour is what the FDA lists on their website as the average time to gather this information. 
The facility manager was responsible for completing the form with the information. The 
cost of this was $2,181 to the company. The cost of registering the facilities on the FDA 
web site was $909. An unexpected cost of the Act was the request of customers for 
verification of registration. There was one secretary that responded to these requests. This 
required four hours per day for the first three weeks of December 2003 and two hours per 
day the final week of December 2003. The time was determined to be sixty hours the first 
three weeks and 10 hours the last week. The cost to the Company was $1,190. 
A Quality Managers meeting included four hours to review the FDA Bioterrorist Act and 
The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism initiative. There were 33 mid-level 
managers, one Vice President, one director, and one Attorney/consultant for four hours. 
The cost of this meeting was $7,201. It is important for the QA managers to understand 
the requirements of the Act since they interact with the FDA. 
Prior to the December 12, 2003 registration deadline there was a 45-minute 
meeting with a VP, Director, and Safety Manager to review implementation of the Act. 
This meeting cost $124. 
The FDA also requires prior notification to the FDA of all shipments into the 
United States. The cost of prior notification to this company is $25 per shipment. The 
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company expects to import 500 shipments so the cost of prior notification is $12,500. An 
emergency contact number must be provided as part of the prior notification 
requirements. This number must be manned twenty-four hours per day. Hiring an 
answering service to notify the emergency contacts costs $312 per year plus $0.68 per 
call the service makes. There is no estimate for emergency calls so no further costs were 
calculated for this requirement. 
An alternative to registering facilities in-house is to use a consultant. “Food-
Agent.com” offers registration services at $300 for a domestic facility, $500 for a single 
foreign facility, and $300 for subsequent years. The fee is $300 in year-one and $150 in 
subsequent years, for two – ten facilities. The cost to industry to register with the FDA 
using one of these services would be $60-120 million. 
Another Government initiative since 9/11 is the Customs Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The Company had one mid-level Safety Manager work on 
this project. There was training at a satellite Conference in Chicago. This came to $423. 
Customs had a three-day conference on understanding C-TPAT in San Francisco. The 
Company sent three managers for implementation, the safety manager, an import 
manager, and a Quality Manager. Costs for these three people to attend this conference 
were $5,307. A questionnaire had to be completed for application to this program. Three 
managers worked on the responses. The cost to complete is $1,039. Customs also 
requires a twenty-four hour emergency contact. This cost was included in the FDA 
requirement. Customs will visit a facility from the company to verify the security 
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measures. The cost for this visit will include four managers for eight hours, or $1,385. 
In the FDA Security Guidelines (8) there is a recommendation to have a person 
responsible for coordinating security at each facility. There were no knowledgeable 
persons at any of the Company’s forty-two facilities. An arrangement was made with a 
security consultant. The consultant did a security analysis at one facility in preparation 
for a one-day security workshop. The visit cost $7,500. The training workshop was held 
in Chicago, Illinois and cost $3,000 for the consultant. There were fifty-one in attendance  
Table 3 – Dollar Cost to Subject Company   
Issue Cost 
Policy Development $   10,708 
Policy Compliance $ 388,555 
Training FDA Bioterrorism Act $     1,233 
Assemble registration information $     2,181 
Registering 42 facilities $        909 
Responding to requests for registration confirmation $     1,190 
QA Managers meeting to review requirements $     7,201 
Team meeting to review implementation $        124 
Prior Notification $   12,500 
FDA Prior Notification Public Outreach Program $        769 
Emergency Contact  $        312 
C-TPAT Satellite Conference $        423 
Customs Training Conference $     5,307 
Complete Customs Questionnaire $     1,039 
Security Coordinator Training $   63,559 
Total =  $ 496,010  
Cost per facility registered (42) =  $   11,810 
 
from the United States, Canada, and Mexico, including five Human Resource Managers, 
two Safety Managers, One Vice President,  
and one Director. The cost to have fifty-one  
managers and supervisors in attendance  Policy Comp
Training
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was $63,559. The total incurred costs to this  
company in response to increased security  
programs due to the events of 9/11 calculates  
as follows (table 3).  
The costs are also broken down to show 86% is for policy compliance and 14% for 
training costs.  (Graph #1) 
Physical Security Cost 
In the Company nine of facilities requested capital funds for improving physical security. 
The costs of the capital expenditure requested to upgrade physical security at the 
company was $222,200 for 2004. (Table 4) With 21% of the facilities requesting capital 
for physical security, the average cost to a facility in the company is $5,290.  
Table 4 – Cost of Physical Security - 2004  
Location Project Cost Maintenance 
Cost 
Plant A Door Security Upgrade $15,000  
Plant A CCTV System $15,000  
Plant B Perimeter Parking lot Fence $15,000  
Whse C Security Door, Vestibule, Maintenance Door $     700  
Plant D CCTV, Electronic Locks $20,000  
Plant E Security Entrance, Front Gate, landscaping, 
Panic Alarm, Shipping / Receiving Security 
$30,000  
Plant F Electronic Locks, CCTV, Panic Alarm $35,000 $1,300 
Plant G Security Gates, Replace Access Doors $41,000  
Whse H Perimeter Fence with Gates $15,900  
Plant I Perimeter Fence, Decorative Fence, CCTV, 
Upgrade Security monitoring 
$34,600 $3,622 
Total = $222,200 $4,922 
 
The cost of future security is driven by what the customer expects. The FDA 
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Guidelines fail to place any emphasis on recommended practices. Each point is a stand-
alone. It is common for companies to request a “security assessment” be done of the 
location and then use the recommendations to score the facility. The basis of the score is 
to then grade the security vulnerability of the facility. These assessments are currently not 
done by security specialists, but by food safety specialists. This grade is not a true 
indication of security at the facility since threats and vulnerability are not known.  
There are food safety professionals using the recommendations as a checklist to 
evaluate the security practices of the industry. These checklists are used to compare 
suppliers and then determine which facility has better security. Many items on the 
security checklist may not be good security practice. Good security practice is 
determining whether a threat is deterred, delayed, or detected. One such questionnaire 
downgraded a facility for not having photograph identification of employees within the 
plant and gave points for having visitors wear smocks in the facility. The threat to the 
facility was not taken into consideration, only whether the item was checked as in place.  
The New York State Department of Health/New York State Department of Agriculture & 
Markets has distributed a “Food Security Survey” for facilities in the State of New York. 
(Appendix 2) This is a 46-item questionnaire with ten sections. It is stated to be 
confidential pursuant to Agriculture and Markets Law Section 23. 
The Indiana State Department of Health has a Security Survey distributed by the 
State Health Commissioner. (Appendix 3) This is a 111-item questionnaire with 13 
sections. To the layperson, having all of these items in place means good security, 
  
 
28 
 
 
 
 
regardless if there is a vulnerability or threat through the items raised. For example, the 
principle of concentric circles is used in security to have layers of protection between the 
area with the greatest vulnerability and the greatest threat of attack. Typical of these 
surveys is a request to fence the property. Some facilities have acres of land with little 
vulnerability yet the cost of fencing, at $18 per linear foot installed is money better spent 
on other vulnerabilities. The survey asks for fencing, so fencing is perceived as 
important. These facilities are expected to install fencing around the perimeter. A large 
customer may believe that only the best security is acceptable and therefore demand that 
all items be in place or the business will be taken elsewhere. 
Small businesses cannot implement all items on these checklists and may lose 
business or be driven out of business by market pressures. Items such as outer perimeter 
secured, check posts, card entry, alarm systems, positive identification and recognition 
systems, security inspections, random inspections of vehicles, etc are on the NYC 
questionnaire. The Indiana questionnaire asks if some one tests the effectiveness of 
strategies such as mock criminal events, criminal background checks of temporary, 
seasonal, and contract workers, a check of closets, toilets, storage areas for packages or 
anomalies, etc.  A facility rating would be downgraded if the questionnaire were 
answered no. Eliminate hiding places in the facility is an item on a checklist.  “Hiding 
places” cannot be eliminated in a manufacturing facility.  
Detailed questionnaires are not just sent by government agencies. These are 
similar to questionnaires circulated by other food manufacturers. There is a twenty-item 
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questionnaire used by Sysco, American Institute of Baking, and Popeye’s in place to rate 
facilities and give a “passing” score based on the items. (Appendix 4) Time is required to 
answer these. One hour each, per facility adds $1,818 to the company. Customers also 
ask for an action plan to correct “deficiencies”. 
 
 
Security Analysis 
Conducting a security analysis at all facilities in the company would cost $7,500 
each. That is $1,500 per day for five days (one-day travel, two days on-site, and two days 
writing the report). A security consultant can analyze the threats and vulnerability and 
recommend the best way to use the company’s resources. The cost of doing a security 
review at all facilities within the company would be $307,500. That is without the 
expenses of travel, lodging, car rentals, and meals. Training an in-house team of mid-
level managers to do the 42 security audits would cost $143,251 so the lower figure will 
be used for future costs. 
A review of security policies and logs to target legitimate threats and 
vulnerabilities should take one manager one hour per month according to the Company 
policy issued. The cost of this is $372 per facility or $15,629 for the Company. 
FDA Recommendations 
Not all FDA Recommendations meet the immediate needs of the company, or do 
not meet the Deter, Delay, or Detect principles of security and would drive costs higher.  
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The first of these recommendations is the employee background check. The company has 
2,500 employees in 42 facilities across the United States. A background check on all 
employees would only show crimes that an employee received a conviction. A more 
accurate item would be the arrest record. Also, an employee with a conviction could 
easily circumvent this by not reporting residential addresses in the county for which the 
conviction occurred. Background checks cost $30 each plus $6 per county. This is the 
rate given the Company by their consultant. The cost of background checks for 2,500 
employees would be $90,000 using just a one county search. 
Recall procedures are a part of most major food facilities and should incur no 
additional costs. This would also limit the impact of an event because adulterated 
material should be easily tracked and recalled. 
Food security awareness training for all staff is also a cost. Training for the 
remaining 2,449 staff would be an expense that will be incurred by the subject company. 
The cost of this training is an average rate of $15 per hour. This training would be at 
overtime bringing the total to $22.50 each. The total is $55,103 for all staff. This does not 
include the cost of providing a trainer and the travel expenses of that trainer. 
Installing higher security locks for restricted areas is recommended, but may not 
meet the criteria of deter, delay, or detect. The cost of this has been proposed through 
capital expenses at some locations. The requests have ranged from $15,000 - $35,000 
depending on the size of the facility and sophistication of the system requested. Installing 
these systems at all facilities would range from $0.6 to $1.5 million. Recommendations to 
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upgrade locks at all facilities would cost $15,000 per location. It would eliminate the key 
and push button code locks. It is easy to update. Lost or stolen cards can be easily 
deactivated. The system also tracks entry through the door. Maintenance for the system is 
based on a service contract. The key cards cost $5 each. A facility that has 300 users 
purchases a pack of 100 cards each quarter due to lost or malfunctioning cards. This cost 
$2,000 per year. The company is eight times larger so the average cost would be $16,000 
per year using the Company employee count. 
The total additional cost of implementing all FDA Security Recommendations is 
estimated to be in excess of $1 million per facility according to Ray Pettit Enterprises, 
Security Consulting Firm; and $2.2 million as stated by Target, Corp. at the C-TPAT 
Training Session in San Francisco, October 28, 2003. 
Future Cost  
Costs to the company going forward would comprise of three main categories. 
These are training, maintenance, and review for performance. Costs of inflation would 
also affect the cost of maintenance so 2004-dollar values are used. Training 
responsibilities include having a responsible person coordinating security at each facility. 
A one-day training session would cost the company $63,559 or $1,513 each facility. This 
training does not produce a “qualified” security expert. Employees need awareness 
training on the elements of basic security. A one hour training session would cost the 
company $55,103 or an average of $22 per employee. A company with a turnover of 10% 
would have an additional six people per facility to do initial training on. Training of four 
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replacement responsible employees would incur an additional $5,736. This would be due 
to turnover, promotion, or change in duties.  
The maintenance of electronic locks and monitoring sensors is calculated by 
taking the cost of new systems from capital requests and extrapolating that to the 
company.  Maintenance of electronic monitoring of security systems would cost the 
company $103,000 or $2,461 per facility. The alternative is to have a member of the 
facility management team inspect the physical security once per day for each day the 
facility is not operating, that is weekends and holidays. The cost at $32 per check is 
$3,328 per weekend checks for one year for one facility. Twenty-seven facilities work 
five-day workweeks so the cost to them is $89,856.  
Taking the facilities that requested capital improvement requests for 2004 and 
dividing the dollars across the company determine the cost of physical security 
improvements. That equals $4,922 per facility on average per year. Prior notification of 
imported products is a recurring expense if maintained at the current level would cost 
$12,500. 
Total cost to the company is $1.03 million per year going forward. This averages 
$24,692 per facility. It includes the assessment, maintenance, and training of employees 
to provide security to the food system. (See Table 5) The future cost to the industry is 
calculated at $4.93 billion annually for domestic food facilities. 
Table 5 Future Costs  
Project Company costs Facility cost 
Continued Security Checks $  388,555 $   9,251 
Prior Notification $    12,500 $      298 
Security Training for 42 Responsible Employees $    63,559 $   1,513 
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Security for Replacement Responsible Employees  $      5,736 $      137 
Maintenance Costs for Electronic Locks and 
Monitors 
$  103,362 $   2,461 
Monitor Security Policies and Vulnerabilities $    15,629 $      372 
Annual Awareness Training for all Employees $    55,103 $   1,312 
Security Audit $  143,251 $   3,411 
Complete one Security Questionnaire $      1,818 $        43 
Electronic Key Card System $    16,000 $      381 
Cost of Physical Security Improvements $  222,200 $   5,290 
Future Planning for Security in 2004-05 $      5,749 $      137 
Total = $1,033,462 $  24,606 
 
Planning for security going forward was done in a meeting with the security 
consultant. This sets the stage for the strategy going forward into the coming 12-18 
month  
period. The meeting cost $5,749. Strategy  
for training and facility assessment was  
done. Training included different classes  
of managers to address both the internal  
threat and the external threat. Future costs  
break down as follows – policy  
compliance 55%, training 12%, and physical improvements 33%. (Graph 2)  
3) Results and Discussion 
The FDA has estimated 400,000 facilities would register under the Act. At the FDA 
Community Outreach Training, March 16, 2004, in Kansas City, Missouri it was reported 
there were only approximately 50% of the expected facilities registered.  That is 190,000 
of the expected 400,000. According to the GAO (RIN: 0910-AC41) the cost of 
Policy Comp
Training
Physical
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compliance with the interim final rule is $367 million (12). The FDA estimates the final 
rule mandate will be over $261 million annually to the private industry (12). There are 
approximately 202,000 domestic facilities expected to register. Using an average cost of 
the subject company’s facilities of $11,810 the total costs to the food industry in the 
United States is $2.4 billion. The cost to the global food industry is $4.7 billion; this is 
well above the $367 million projected by the General Accounting Office. 
As of January 8, 2003 Customs reported 5,200 companies applied for the C-TPAT 
program. Customs does not have the ability to break down the applicants by industry type 
or SIC code. The average cost for C-TPAT to each facility in the Company was $161. 
Removing this from the 205,000 domestic facilities would reduce the cost by $32 million, 
or $64 million to the global industry. 
Going forward the average cost per facility is $24,606. This figure is higher because a 
factor for physical security has been added. The ongoing cost of improving security will 
be $4.9 billion annually to the domestic market. The added cost is based on two issues. 
The first is the cost of training qualified people at each location to monitor the security 
efforts. The second is the cost of physical upgrades. The upgrades will be a response to 
the FDA recommendations and the analysis of security reviews. The market will drive 
some improvements since there will be assessments made by unqualified auditors. 
Qualified security professionals should do security assessments.  The assessment should 
not be done with a weighted checklist that is completed by food safety specialists.  
4) Conclusions: 
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Determining what is good security will be a challenge when implementing the 
recommendations of the FDA. The food industry has always been vulnerable due to the 
scope of the business. The events of September 11, 2001 provided an incentive to reduce 
vulnerability. The cost of identifying specific threats from both internal and external 
sources has increased from both governmental and customer pressures. Threats from 
within an organization are difficult to reduce. The FDA Bioterrorist Act increased 
security costs of at least fourteen thousand dollars to the subject company facilities. There 
are estimates of $1-2 million dollars per facility for implementing the security guidelines. 
Some of this will be borne by the industry as customers pressure suppliers to do 
something, even if it is not good security. The cost of complying with the FDA 
Bioterrorist Act, Custom Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, and implementing good 
security to protect against both internal and external threats is much more than the 
government estimates. The FDA estimated complying with the final rule would incur a 
cost of $367 million. Calculations made from the experience of the company show the 
average facility will incur an initial cost of $11,810 to develop policies, train employees 
and begin initial physical assessments to protect the facility. This equals a cost to industry 
of $2.4 billion to domestic facilities and $4.7 billion to all facilities doing business in the 
Unites States.  
The maintenance of security initiatives will incur an average cost of $24,606 per 
facility to implement physical security, electronic monitoring, and security awareness 
training of all staff. The ongoing cost to the domestic industry will be $4.9 billion. The 
  
 
36 
 
 
 
 
cost to all facilities doing business in the United States will be $9.8 billion. 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have resulted in the focus of security on 
the vulnerabilities of the food industry. The cost to defend against a threat has incurred 
additional costs that were not in place prior to the events of September 11,2001. Security 
against terrorists is but one threat. There are many security threats that must also be 
protected. A good security program will recognize vulnerabilities and provide 
countermeasures. 
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Appendix 1 
Formulas: 
Midlevel Manager 60k (1) (60,000/40)/52 = 28.85 x 1.5 (benefit factor) = 
cost p/hr 
$43.28
Supervisor 43K (2) (43,000/40)/52 = 20.67 x 1.5 = cost p/hr $31.01
Facility Manager 72k (2) (72,000/40)/52 = 34.62 x 1.5 = cost p/hr $51.93
Administrative Assistant 11.33 X 1.5 = cost p/hr $17.00
Vice President 100k (2) (100,000/40)/52 = 48.08 x 1.5 = cost p/hr $72.12
Director (2) (70,000/40)/52 = 33.65 x 1.5 = cost p/hr $50.48
Legal Consultant 300 p/hr 
Security Consultant 1,500 per day + expenses 
Policy Meeting (4 x 31.01) + 43.28 = (167.32 x 16hrs) = $2,677 
x 4 Policies = Cost per meeting 
$10,708
Door Checks ((31.01 x 0.5) x 3) x 365 = $16,977.98 x 16  = 
$271,647 (24/7 operation) 
((((31.01 x 0.5))) x 2)) x 5) x 52 = 8,062 x 2 = 
$24,188(16/5 operation) 
(((31.01 x 0.5)) x 5) x 52 = $4,031 x 25 = 
$92,720 (8/5 operation) 
388,555
FDA Information 
Gathering 
51.93 x 42 = cost  $2,181
FDA Facility registration (43.28/0.5hr) x 42 = cost $909
FDA Prior notification 
public outreach program 
(43.28 X 12) + $249.64 expenses to Kansas City, 
MO = cost 
$769
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Registration verification ((20 X 3) + 10 = 70) x $17 = cost $1,190
Quality Meeting (33X$43.28X4) + (72.12X4) + (300X4) = cost $7,201
45 min facility registration 
meeting 
(50.48+43.28+72.12) x 0.75 = cost $124
FDA Bioterrorism 
Minneapolis, MN  
May 6-7, 2003 
(43.28 X 16) + $540.52 expenses (Mileage, hotel, 
food, telephone) = cost 
 $1,233
C-TPAT Training San 
Francisco 
(43.28 X 3 X 12) +  $3,749 expenses, mileage, 
airfare, hotel, car rental for one, telephone, food) 
= cost 
$5,307
C-TPAT Satellite 
Conference 
(43.28 X 8) + $76.76 expenses to Chicago = cost $423
Customs Questionnaire 43.28 X 8 X 3 = cost $1,039
Customs Visit $43.28 x 8 x 4  =cost $1,385
Capital Costs $222,200 / 42 facilities = average cost per year $5,290
Linear foot Warehouse H $15,900 / 890 Linear feet = cost per/ft $17.87
Answer Security 
Questionnaires 
43.28 X 42 = cost $1,817.76
Security Policy Review $31.01 x 12 = $372.12 x 42 facilities = cost $15,629.04
Supervisor $31.01 X 16hrs X 42 supervisors = $20,839
VP $72.12 X 16 X 2 =  $2,308
Director $50.48 X 16 =  $808
Mid-level manager $43.28 X 16 X 5 =  $3,462
Airline costs 23 X $500 =  $11,500
Mileage $0.345 X 300 X 29 = $3,002
Meals $35 p/day X 52 X 2 =  $3,640
Hotel $100 p/day X 52 =  $5,200
Security Consultant =  $10,500
Consultant expenses = $2,300
Security 101 Training 
Total for Security 101 Training =  $63,559
   
Security Self Audit 
Training 
Security Consultant to conduct 5 Day training –  
5 days X $1,500 = $7,500 
+ 2 days preparation = $3,000 
+ Expenses room 5x$100 = $500 
+ Airfare =  $600 
+ Meals 5 X $35 = $175  
$11,775 
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 10 Mid-level managers $43.28X40X10 = 
$17,312 
+ Rooms 5 X $100 = $500 X 10 = $5,000 
+ Meals 5 X $35 = $175 X 10 = $1,750 
+ Travel 2 airfare @ $500 = $1,000 
+ Mileage 8 @ 200 X $0.345 = $552 
$25,614 
1 Mid-level manager 40 hours X 43.28 = $1,731 
$1,731 X 41 audits = $70,971 
Hotel 5 days X 100 = $500 
$500 X 41 audits = $20,500 
Meals 5 X $35 = $175 
$175 X 41 Audits = $7,175 
$98,646 
Travel – Airfare 5 trips to 10 plants X $500 = 
$2,500  
+ Car rental $250 per week X 10 weeks = $2,500 
+ Mileage average 200 miles roundtrip per 
facility 200 X 32 facilities X $0.345 per/mile = 
$2,208 
$7,208 
Cost of 41 Security Audits 
Total cost for In-House Security Audits =  $143,251 
Security Consultant 
Audits 
$1,500 per day X 5 days per audit = $7,500 
$7,500 X 41 facilities = $307,500 + Expenses 
Travel, meals, hotel (Cost for security audit) 
$307,500 
Future Planning (2 x 82.12) + (2 x 50.48) + (4 x 42.28) +  
(2 x 42.28) = $518.88 
Consultant = 3.5 x $1,500 = $5,250 + $518.88 = 
Cost of the planning meeting 
$5,769 
1 – Safety & Health Magazine Nov 2003, East North Central Salary Range 
2 – http://careers.msm.com  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 














